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THE STANDARDIZED MONITORING, ANALYSIS AND
REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS (MARA): AN EFFECTIVE TOOL
FOR ENDING ARMED CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL
VIOLENCE?*
FrancescoSeatzu**
Abstract
Prior to the development of standardized monitoring, analysis and
reporting agreements (MARA) on conflict-related sexual violence
(CRSV) in 2010, CRSV was a phenomenon mostly unknown in its real
numbers. This situation was rightly perceived as unacceptable by several
reports, including UN documents. However, the establishment of MARA
lead to the introduction of a number of criteria and rules for the gathering
and reporting of information and data on CRSV crimes to the UN
Security Council. It was widely believed that these innovations would
enhance the fight against these crimes at United Nations level. This
Article .critically examines the various rules and criteria through which
the MARA has contributed to the fight against sexual crimes and abuses
in armed conflict and post-conflict scenarios. It asserts that due to the
continued growth of CRSV incidents, the benefits anticipated to reduce
these odious crimes under MARA have remained elusive throughout the
ten years since the MARA was created. This Article makes suggestions
for the improvement of the monitoring and reporting activities of MARA.
"Rape in war leaves many unseen scars that continue to

haunt survivors long after the guns have fallen silent and the
conflict has ended."
Mrs. Zainab Hawa Bangura, former Special Representative
of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG-SVC)

* This work is dedicated to the loving memory of Professor Robert Cryer of Birmingham
University.
** PhD (Nottingham); Full Professor of International and European Union Law,

University of Cagliari (Italy).
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This work proposes an alternative to the MARA process as it stands
in its current form. The alternative aims at the dual objective of increasing
the external accountability of state and non-state armed groups for sexual
abuse and violence committed by them and of enhancing the coordination
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of MARA with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Our proposal
envisions, in particular, the transformation of MARA into a de facto
though not de jure auxiliary organ of the ICC.1 To say it more precisely,
I propose its transformation into a fact-finding mechanism aimed at
assisting the Office of the Prosecutor .(OTP) of the ICC 2 in its
investigations of sexual violence and abuses that occurred in armed
conflict or quasi-armed conflict contexts. 3 The rationale behind this
proposal is clear and sound: to provide the UN Security Council a new
opportunity to aid and support the ICC's work, 4 namely a new chance for
it to meet its responsibilities to cooperate with the ICC at every stage
including the stages after the UN Security Council's referral of a situation
to the ICC. 5
My contribution is articulated and structured as follows. Part I
discusses the origin, or the substantive and legal background behind, the
establishment of the MARA process. Part II explains the MARA's
architecture and procedure, as well as its enforcement. Part III sets forth
the major criticisms of the MARA. Part IV sets forth my reform proposal.
The contribution concludes with a discussion of why I claim that my
proposal improves upon other reform proposals to MARA. These and my
proposals would transform MARA into a defacto auxiliary organ of the
ICC's OTP and therefore into a feasible tool for widening the narrow

1. The ICC is not a UN organ, despite being established by a UN conference. See Rome
Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) ("The
Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be
approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the

President of the Court on its behalf.").
2. See Richard Goldstone, International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc Tribunals, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 463, 560 (Sam Daws & Thomas G. Weiss
eds.,

2018) ("Although the ICC is not a UN constituent body, its Statute provides for the establishment
of a legal relationship between the two.").
3. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), "[r]ape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity" are recognized both as crimes against humanity and as
war crimes. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(g), U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998). See also S.C. Res. 1612 (July 26, 2005) (implementing a zero-

&

tolerance policy for sexual abuse or misconduct by troops operating on behalf of the United
Nations).
4. For information on the responsibilities of the Security Council, see Hemi Mistry
Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, The UN Security Council and the International Criminal
Court,
PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR GLOBAL ACTION (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.pgaction.org/pdf/
activity/Chatham-ICC-SC.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N5P-LT64] (observing that "one of the greatest
dangers to the effectiveness of the Court is the failure of the Council to provide ... support to the
ICC once it has referred to it a situation").
5. See generally 5 ALEXANDRE SKANDER GALAND, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRALS TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn et al. eds., 2018) (outlining the UN Security

Council Referrals to the ICC).
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perspective from which MARA currently looks at sexual violence and
abuse against girls and women during armed conflicts.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONITORING, ANALYSIS AND
REPORTING AGREEMENTS

In December 2010, after conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) on
women and girls had become a matter of increasing international
concern 6 and after the lack of reliable information and data about CRSV
had become a thematic issue on the United Nations Security Agenda, the
United Nations Security Council (the Security Council) established the
development of standardized monitoring, analysis and reporting
agreements (MARA) on CRSV incidents through its landmark resolution
in 19607 The resolution, the fifth Security Council resolution on women,
peace and security, was adopted by unanimous vote by the Council at its
6,453rd meeting.
The creation of the MARA was the continuation of the post-Cold War
trend in the international community of monitoring, reporting, and factfinding (MRF) mechanisms to collect information on the vulnerabilities
of civilian populations. 9 At the same time, it was an unprecedented step
to increase the UN Security Council's involvement and powers in the
protection of women's and girls' rights in armed conflicts along the
pathway provided by the UN Secretary-General's call for an "era of
0
application" of international human rights norms,1 and of the pathway
6. In this work, the term "sexual violence" refers to the sexual element of crimes
committed against a victim based on gender. For the same use of this term, see 20 ANNE-MARIE
For a similar
L. M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 12 (2005).

but not identical definition, see Wolfgang Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual
Violence Under International Criminal Law, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 121-41 (2007); Alison

Cole, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi: The New Definitionfor Prosecuting Rape Under International

Under
Law, 8 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 55, 55-86 (2008); Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy
625,
REV.
L.
RTS.
HUM.
COLUM.
32
Consent,
and
Autonomy,
Dignity,
the ICC Statute: Human
625-75 (2001). See also the definition of sexual violence given by the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTRI (Sept. 2, 1998) (claiming that sexual violence

shall be deemed as including ". . . any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive").
7. See Gina Heathcote, Naming and Shaming: Human Rights Accountability in Security

Council Resolution 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security, 4 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 82, 82

(2012); see also John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Zero Tolerance, Naming and Shaming: Is
There a Casefor it with Crimes of the Powerful?, 35 AUSTL. N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269, 269-88

(2002).
8. S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010).
9. See Rob Grace & Claude Bruderlein, On Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-finding

Mechanisms, I EUR. SOC'Y INT'L L. REFLECTIONS 1, 3 (2012).
10. Rep. to the Senior Management Grp. The Legal Counsel Chairman of the Inter-

Departmental Grp., Inter-Departmental Group to Implement the Action Plan: An Era of
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provided by the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS). 1
Moreover, and equally worth noting, the creation of the MARA was the
continuation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM)1 2
adopted with the Security Council (SC) resolutions 1612 of 2005"3 and
1882 of 2009 on children and armed conflict.14
Prior to and after the establishment of the MARA, the UN Security
Council, like the UN General Assembly' 5 and the UN SecretaryGeneral,1 6 engaged in a number of efforts and attempts to ameliorate the
international protection of women's and girls' rights in armed conflict
scenarios. Far from being surprising, these efforts and attempts, among
which one can include the United Nations adoption of the UN Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in
197917 along with the 1982 Declaration on the Participation of Women
in Promoting International Peace and Cooperation, are the obvious
consequence of the fact that, for too many centuries, sexual violence has
been considered collateral damage in time of war' 8 and a "reward" for
fighting according to large segments of military forces.1 9 Of these efforts
and attempts, that were, rightly we believe, perceived by the Security
Application of InternationalLaw, U.N. Doc. https://www.un.org/law/technical/FinalReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD6V-EB6Y].
11. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda was formally initiated by the landmark
U.N. Security Council (SCOR) Resolution 1325 (2000). See generally United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), Global Handbook: Parliamentsas PartnersSupporting the
Women, Peace andSec. Agenda, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/peace/conflictprevention-peacebuilding/Parliament_aspartnerssupporting theWomenPeace_andSecurity

_Agenda_-_A_Global_Handbook.pdf (discussing UN SCOR groundbreaking endorsement in
S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000)).
12. See, e.g., Francesco Seatzu, The Monitoring & Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave
Children'sRights Violations: Promotingthe Protection of Children's Rights in Armed Conflicts
Through Adjudication?, 24 MAx PLANCK Y.B. INT'L L. 362,398 (2020) (on file with author);
Francesca Capone, A Critical Overview of the United Nations Architecture on Children and
Armed Conflict: What Role for Sanctions? 27 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 115-30 (2018).
13. S.C. Res. 1612 (July 26, 2005).
14. S.C. Res. 1882 (Aug. 1, 2009).
15. The last of these efforts was the adoption of Resolution 2467 (2019) by a vote of thirteen
in favor to none against, with two abstentions (the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation), during a wide-ranging debate on the prevention and implications of sexual violence.
In this resolution, the Security Council reiterated its demand for the complete cessation of all acts
of sexual violence by all parties to armed conflict. S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019).
16. See Policy Committee Decision No. 2007/31, Violence against Women, 15 June 2007,
also available at: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osaginew/oUnite.html [https://perma.cc/R8

NU-K98F].
17. G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (Dec. 18, 1979).
18. See Ted Alcorn, Responding to Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, 383 LANCET 2034,
2034 (2014) (stressing that "sexual violence in conflict remains a tenaciously difficult problem to
study and therefore to address").
19. G.A. Res. 37/63 (Dec. 3, 1982).
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Council as dictated by its primary institutional mandate to maintain
international peace and security, the most significant has been the
20
adoption of ten thematic resolutions on "Women, Peace and Security."
Amongst these resolutions that reflect by their existence the reality that
sexual violence is a frequently occurring deplorable abuse engaged in
during armed conflict, it is worth recalling Resolution 1379 of 2001.21
Here the members of the UN Security Council acknowledged that women
and a gender perspective are relevant to negotiating international peace
treaties, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations, and
22
reconstructing war-torn societies for sustainable peace. Again, one can
also recall resolution 1820 of 2008 in which the Security Council, after
having for the first time forbidden the use of sexual violence as a weapon
23
and tactic of war (and as a tactic of terrorism), acknowledged, in line
24
with the Rome Statute of the ICC, that rape and other forms of sexual
violence can constitute a war crime, crime against humanity, or a
25
constitutive act with respect to genocide.
After unrelenting pressure from the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) 26 and from the academic world, both of which were
disappointed by the lack of female inclusion in peace-making processes
and by the lack of a systematic enforcement of past Security Council
resolutions and other international legal provisions and standards on
women and armed conflict, the Council established the MARA to
enhance the external accountability of state and non-state armed groups
for their sexual-related violations and abuses against girls and women.27
Country-based task forces established in country-situations where
parties to conflict have been listed in the annexes of an annual report of
the Secretary-General on CRSV (the Annual Report) manage the MARA.
The MARA is charged with the gathering of timely, accurate and reliable
20. S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000); S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 1888 (Sept.
30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1889 (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010); S.C. Res. 2106 (June
24, 2013); S.C. Res. 2122 (Oct. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2242 (Oct. 13, 2015); S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr.
23, 2019); S.C. Res. 2493 (Oct. 29, 2019).
21. S.C. Res. 1379 (Nov. 20, 2001).
22. Id. at ¶8(a), (b), (e).
23. S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008); see also Global Justice Center, Rape as an Illegal Tactic
of War, GLOBAL JUSTICE CENTER (June 2014), https://globaljusticecenter.net/documents/Rape
%20as%20Tactic%20of%20War%20QA%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6SA-MPSH].
24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998).
25. Fatou Bensouda, Gender andSexual Violence Under the Rome Statute, in FROM HUMAN
RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 401, 416 (Emmanuel Decaux et al. eds., 2007).
26. Frederic de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces (ICRC, Geneva,

1987),

§ 194.

27. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, ProsecutingWartime Rape and OtherGender-RelatedCrimes
Under InternationalLaw: ExtraordinaryAdvances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L

L. 288, 305-47 (2003).
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information on patterns and trends of sexual violence in situations of
conflict, post-conflict and other situations of concern for the UN
Secretary-General such as political strife. And, in the view of its
institutional architects, it is aimed to be a systematic and comprehensive
reporting mechanism, capable of producing detailed information on
parties to armed conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or
being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of CRSV. For the
purposes of reporting on the MARA, CRSV refers to incidents or (for
SCR 1960 listing purposes) patterns of sexual violence in conflict or postconflict settings or other situations of concern (e.g., political strife) and
that have a direct or indirect nexus with the conflict or political strife
itself, i.e., a temporal, geographical and/or causal link. Specifically,
violations may encompass, apart from rape, sexual slavery, forced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity, against women, men, girls or
boys.
The MARA's functions and procedures, including the basic elements
for enforcing the MARA mechanism and its harmonization with the
Gender-Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS),
are outlined in the ProvisionalGuidance Note on the Implementation of
Resolution 1960 (the Provisional Guidance Note). This is revised and
updated periodically according to lessons-learned from implementing
resolution 1960.28
Notwithstanding some positive outcomes such as the contribution
given by the information and data gathered through MARA to the
enhancement of the capacity of international peacekeepers in the
prevention and response to incidents of CRSV, there are many critiques
related to the MARA process and functioning. These critiques persist
regardless of the adoption in 2015 of an instrument that has a positive
effect on the operation and functioning of MARA-the UNPOL bestpractices toolkit on policing and training curriculum for UN Police on
preventing and investigating sexual and gender-based violence in postconflict settings (the UN CRSV Policy); 29 and also notwithstanding the
good results achieved so far by the MARA process through its
collaborative activities with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs),

28. UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence
in Conflict, Provisional Guidance Note - Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1960
(2010) On Women, Peace andSecurity (conflict-relatedsexual violence), July 2011, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e23ed5d2.html [https://perma.cc/SZ6Y-V364].
29. UN Department of Peace Operations, United Nations Police Gender Toolkit:

Standardized Best Practices on Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping - Handbook (2015),

https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/unitednations_policegendertoolkit_handbookl
[https://perma.cc/EFW3-5MZB].
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other civil society groups, UN entities and in particular the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Critics often contest that MARA effectively increases the external
accountability of state and of non-state armed groups-that incidentally
are generally responsible for the majority of sexual abuses and
violence 30-as well as often contesting the accuracy, completeness and
objectivity of the information gathered through the MARA Working
Group on conflict-related sexual violence, the first of the two main bodies
3
that currently compose MARA. 1 The development of public
accountability mechanisms for non-state actors aimed at operating in
isolation from strategies to prevent sexual violence in armed conflicts has
also been criticized." And this, together with the traditional reductive
perspective that considers women only as victims of armed conflicts, and
not also as active players in peacemaking and conflict resolution.
Exemplary in this sense is the allegation contained in the UNICEF's
Central African Evaluation Report of 2016 that states that linkages
between the MRM, MARA and GBV prevention, response and
33
coordination are in need of reformulation. Equally exemplary is the
allegation that monitoring through the MARA process would need to be
extended to encompass strategies and actions for increasing women's
34
participation in the delivery of justice mechanisms locally and globally.
Another criticism that has been voiced is that MARA fails to give
assistance to women and girls who have suffered sexual violence.
Surprisingly this is-although the intention of the MARA-is to use the
information gathered to inform the development of comprehensive
strategies to address conflict related sexual violence, including
35
programmatic responses for survivors at the country-level. There is also
the other criticism concerning the lack of direct women's participation in

TO
30. See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ENGAGING WITH STATE ARMED FORCES

PREVENT SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2019).
31. See, e.g., MEGAN BASTICK ET AL., SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN ARMED CONFLICT - GLOBAL
OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR (2007).

32. See, e.g., Manuela Colombini, Gender-based and Sexual Violence Against Women
During Armed Conflict (2002), 4 J. HEALTH MGMT. 167, 177 (2002).
33. See UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, MULTI-COUNTRY EVALUATION OF GENDERBASED VIOLENCE IN EMERGENCIES (2016).
34. See INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW ORGANIZATION, STRENGTHENING WOMEN'S

(2017),
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING RIGHTS A REALITY FOR WOMEN2 AND GIRLS
2
2
OAccess% Oto% 0
https://www.ido.int/system/files/event-documents/IDLO%20CN%20%
Justice%20for%2OWomen%20and%2OGirls%20N0%20CONTACTS.PDF
[https://perma.cc/J28P-EVJL].
35. See U.N. Women, Violence against Women in Conflict, Post-conflict and Emergency
Settings, at 145 (2013), https://www.ainap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/14056
12658.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL6Q-C5C4]; Doris Schopper, Responding to the Needs ofSurvivors
ofSexual Violence: Do We Know What Works?, 9 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 585, 594 (2014).
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the MARA process and in the reporting of sexual violence. 36 It is my view
that to this list of criticisms one may add the narrow subject matter scope
of application of MARA according to its establishing resolution that,
unlike the African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,37
does not deal with 'violence against women' in general terms but only
with sexual crimes and abuse. 38 Also the lack of effective coordination of
MARA with the GBVIMS has been criticised, and this regardless of the
efforts and attempts made in the Provisional Guidance Note on the
Implementation of Resolution 1960. One may further recall the lack of
consideration by the MARA process of trauma and suffering related to
sexual violence and war, together with the lack of consideration of
"opportunistic sexual violence" committed in post-conflict settings 39 as
well with the lack of consideration of CRSV when committed by
civilians. Again this is regardless of the existence of findings pointing to
a clustering of interventions in post-conflict settings, predominantly
addressing opportunistic sexual violence, 40 and also notwithstanding the
fact that civilians may be responsible for war crimes according to the
Rome Statute of the ICC. 4 1
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARA PROCESS
The MRM on grave violations against children in situations of armed
conflict was the real impetus behind the establishment of MARA, and
36. See generally Karen Engle, The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council
Resolutions on Human Security,

in

FORTHCOMING

IN

RETHINKING PEACEKEEPING, GENDER

EQUALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 23-47 (Gina Heathcote & Dianne Otto eds., 2014); see also
U.N. WOMEN, WOMEN AND PEACE AND SECURITY: GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL

IMPLEMENTATION.

37. See generally African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's

Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (July 11, 2003), https://www.refworld.org/docid/
3f4b139d4.html [https://perma.cc/SL7C-Q9ZP].
38. The African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, defines "violence
against women" to include:
all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical,
sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts;
or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of
fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time or during situations
of armed conflict[] or war.
See Karima Bennoune, Do We Need New InternationalLaw to Protect Women in Armed
Conflict?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 363, 367 (2007).
39. See Alcorn, supra note 18, at 2037 (explaining the phenomenon of 'opportunistic sexual

violence').
40. See Jo Spangaro et al., What Evidence Exists for Initiatives to Reduce Risk and

Incidence of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and Other Humanitarian Crises?A Systematic
Review, PLOS ONE, May 2013, at 1.
41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.

3.
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42
this, together with the statements delivered by Margot Wallstr6m and
shared by several prominent feminist legal scholars like Rhonda
45
Copelonon, 43 Bridget Byrne44 and Christine Chinkin on the necessity
not to see sexual violence in armed conflicts exclusively through a
46
reproductive health and development lens. As requested by the Report
of the UN Secretary General on the implementation of resolutions 1820
and 1888 to develop a monitoring and reporting mechanism addressing
CRSV, the Security Council created it in its resolution 1960 of 2010.
Among the issues requested for consideration by the Secretary General
in his Report were, in particular, the protection of the victims of
trafficking and sexual violence committed by terrorist groups, the
enhancement of information sharing and judicial cooperation amongst
47
members of the UN family.
The reasons supporting the above-mentioned claim on the influence
of the MRM process on MARA are indeed not hard to spot, namely the
structural and procedural similarities between the MRM and the MARA
process that largely outweigh their differences as better explained below.
Apart from this, they are also reasons that are quite easy to understand,
MRM is
given in particular the fact that coordination of MARA with 48
(rightly) deemed as essential in the ProvisionalGuidance Note.
Another important, though only indirect, impetus for the
establishment of MARA were the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR and
their judicial decisions that had a pivotal role in the identification of
sexual violence as a war weapon instead of a natural consequence of

42. Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual violence
in Conflict Margot Wallstr6m (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/SRSG-Statement-on-W omen-Peace-Security-23-February-2012.pdf.

[https://perma.cc/Z3X9-YTR6]

in
43. See Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women
(1994).
248
243,
L.J.
WOMEN'S
5
HASTINGS
Law,
Humanitarian
44. See Bridget Byrne, Towards a Gendered Understanding of Conflict, in GENDER AND
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 30, 32 (2002). See also Catherine MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and
Women's Human Rights, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
183, 193 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., Marion J. Faber trans., University of Nebraska Press 1994)
(1993).
45. See Christine Chinkin, Gender-Related Crimes: A Feminist Perspective, in FROM
FOR JUSTICE IN A
SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH

WORLD OF STATES 116, 122 (Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004).
EJIL
46. See Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in InternationalLaw, 5
326, 326 (1994).
47. U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/65/592 (Nov. 24, 2010).
48. U.N. Off. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Provisional Guidance
and
Note: Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1960 (2010) On Women, Peace
https://www.refworld.org/docid/
Security (Conflict-Related Sexual Violence) (June 2011),

4e23ed5d2.html [https://perma.cc/7DC8-74W5].
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war 49 and in the development of contestations of the protection that the
1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols have provided
and continue to provide against sexual violence in armed conflict
scenarios. 50 The statutes also had an equally crucial role in the
consideration of rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes in their
own right under the Rome Statute. In this last respect, it should be noted
that "rape" has been interpreted by the ICC as constituting genocide when
it was "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, national,
ethnical, racial or religious groups," (Rome Statute Article 6); a crime
against humanity "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack," (Article 7);51 and a war crime "when committed as part of a plan
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes" (Article
8). The Rome Statute in reality goes even further than that. And in fact,
unlike the ICTY and ICTR, it does not identify sexual violence with
rapes2 so as to also criminalize sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and any other sexual violence of
comparable gravity (Article .7(1)(g)). 53 Moreover, persecution is also

49. Katie O'Byrne, Beyond Consent: Conceptualising Sexual Assault in International

CriminalLaw, 11 INT'L CRIMINAL L. REV. 495, 500 (2001); Alex Obote Odora, Rape and Sexual
Violence in InternationalLaw: ICTR Contribution, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135-63
(2005).
50. Among those criticisms, it is worth mentioning those concerning the narrow scope of
the legal interest protected by these provisions that seems to refer exclusively to the honour and
dignity of women within a patriarchal and phallocratic view. Amplius, see Magdalena M. Martin
& Isabel Lirola, Sexual crimes in InternationalHumanitarianLaw (Institut Catala international
per la pau, 2013), p. 12, at p. 13, who also recalls that: 'This outlook would also be confirmed by
the fact that even the Geneva Convention provisions that consider a more active position of
women are centred almost exclusively on their role as mothers'. See also Women Facing
War,
'ICRC Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women - Executive Summary', available at:
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46e943750.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE4Z-9YN4]; Kelly Askin,
Comfort Women: Shifting Shame and Stigma from Victims to Victimizers, 13 INT'L CRIMINAL L.
REV. 5-32 (2001); Judith Gardam, Women, Human Rights and InternationalHumanitarian
Law,
324 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 421-32 (1998).
51. UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2106 (2013), on sexual violence in conflict,
states that sexual violence can constitute a crime against humanity and a constitutive act of
genocide, and that other forms of serious sexual violence in armed conflicts are war crimes.
52. The 'Elements of Crimes' of the ICC Statute, adopted in 2002 and revised in 2010,
define rape as 'invasion' or "penetration" that is "committed by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment."

53. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), sexual violence may be defined
as: 'any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments oradvances, or acts
to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person's sexuality usingcoercion, by any person
regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and
work' See WHO, World Report on Violence and Health, at 147, ed. Etienne G. Krug (2002).
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included in the Rome Statute as a crime against humanity and the Rome
54
Statute explicitly recognized the gender basis of persecution.
Especially given these and other developments in the area of
international criminal law and policy, the public debate within civil
society and the United Nations at that time was not whether or not the
UN Security Council should institute a supervisory mechanism that
addresses sexual violence against civilians in armed conflict, but rather
what type of supervisory mechanism the Security Council should
establish. Generally, the proposals for a monitoring and reporting
mechanism fell into two broad categories: (1) proposals calling for a unit
competent to examine exclusively rape and other forms of sexual
violence against women and girls in armed conflict scenarios identified
in resolution 1960 and (2) proposals calling for a mechanism that was
also competent to consider sexual violence against boys and men
55
committed in times of armed conflict. In 2009, just one year after the
adoption of its landmark resolution 1820 that recognizes physical and
56
sexual violences and abuses against female civilians as security issues,
the Security Council requested, in its resolution 1888, the UN SecretaryGeneral to develop a proposal to ensure monitoring and reporting of
sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations against women and
girls, and to appoint a special representative for sexual violence.
Conversely, the UN Secretary General, in his report on children and
armed conflict in Afghanistan (S/2008/695), advocated for a monitoring
mechanism with a mandate that also encompasses sexual violence against
men and boys.5 7 Other outside observers also presented proposals for
monitoring and reporting mechanisms. For instance, Dr. No6lle
Quenivet, advocated for the use of the reporting system established by
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) to assess States' compliance with General
Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and
the inherent
post-conflict situations.58 This proposal, and especially

54. See Silahli Qatamalar ve Kadmlara Y6nelik Cinsel $iddet, Onlenemez Bir Ikili Mi,

Armed Conflicts and Sexual Violence Against Women: An Inevitable Accompaniment?, 28
KOSBED 1, 1-20 (2014).
J.
55. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict, 18 EuR.
INT'L L. 253 (2007).

56. See Rep. Of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2002/1154 (Oct. 16, 2002) ("[s]ustainable peace and

security will not be achieved without women's full and equal participation").

57. Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2008/695 (Nov. 10, 2008).

58. See Amnesty Int'l, Combating sexual violence in conflict: Recommendations to states

at the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (May 30, 2014)
30 0 62
04en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUH2-TRYG] (The
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/ior5
General Recommendation provides authoritative guidance to States parties on legislative, policy
the
and other appropriate measures to ensure full compliance with their obligations under
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criticisms of the MARA process as currently designed, are also implicitly
shared by Gina Heathcote, the author of one of the very few contributions
on MARA from an international human rights perspective. Heathcote
indicates that:
Without a renewed Security Council effort to respond to the
need for recognition and support of women's participation at
all stages of conflict resolution (including in the Council
itself), the approach of resolution 1960 remains one that tilts
the Council's agenda towards subordination feminism, that
denies the intersection of race, class and gender in
contemporary institutional approaches, and that does little to
encourage the participation of non state actors, particularly
armed groups, in conflict resolution processes that build
communities representative of all.5 9
III. THE MARA's PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT

Since its inception, the MARA's dual role has been to monitor,
analyse and report arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence
against civilian personnel and to monitor commitments by parties of
conflict to prevent and address sexual violence against civilians. In
theory, the MARA fills its double-articulated role by providing timely
and objective information on sexual crimes during wartime to the UN
Security Council. Along with the aim of helping the Council in its action
of reducing the risk of sexual violence in armed conflict scenarios,
providing assistance to survivors, and maintaining security and peace.
Resolution 1960 clarifies that the Special Representative of the Secretary
General on conflict related sexual violence is the entity in charge of
MARA's implementation that, as better specified in the Provisional
Guidance Note on the implementation of Resolution 1960, is to be carried
out in accordance with the Secretary-General's Policy Committee
Decision No. 2010/30 on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Report of
the Secretary-General (A/65/592-S/2010/604) on the implementation of
resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009). That is indeed important, as it
means that the implementation of MARA shall always be in conformity
with the criteria indicated therein for dialogue with parties to conflict and
with the conceptual and analytical framing of "conflict-related sexual
violence" for the purpose of facilitating the analysis on what may be
reported as conflict-related sexual violence.
Gina Heathcote has considered MARA as a step beyond the so called
"1325 framework" (Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and
currently also as the most prominent institutional framework protecting
Convention to protect, respect and fulfil women's human rights, including with regard to
preventing and addressing sexual violence).
59. Heathcote, supra note 7, at 103.
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women and girls from sexual violence in armed conflict. In her view, the
MARA process has the potential for a systematic engagement of state
armed groups on women's and girls' protection, in particular given its
60
"naming and shaming" approach. Undoubtedly, though the "naming
and shaming" approach that the MARA champions constitutes a
reputational disincentive for violators,61 in particular for state armed
groups, critics have pointed out various flaws that hinder the MARA's
operativeness and effectiveness (as also acknowledged by Heathcote
herself).
A. UN Security Council Resolution 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace, and
Security
Pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1960, MARA Taskforces
shall be established in countries where conflict-related sexual violence is
documented or suspected to have occurred. The Provisional Guidance
Note makes clear that beyond situations on the UN Security Council's
security agenda, the Secretary-General through Special Representative
on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC) is allowed to indicate-in
consultation with UN Action-which countries must be regarded as
situations of concern. 62 The Provisional Guidance Note goes further than
that and clarifies, amongst other things, that the emphasis of MARA
should not change, but may do so depending on context, especially in
63
regards to conflict as opposed to post-conflict situations. The reason is
easy to identify, and it has been fully brought out in the Provisional
Guidance Note where it is stated that those aspects of MARA related to
identifying parties to conflict and perpetrators, or the engagement with
such parties for protection commitments, is generally more relevant in
situations of conflict than in post-conflict situations. But this, of course,
does not mean that in post-conflict situations there is little need for
reliable and timely analysis of patterns and trends of sexual violence. In
fact, it is explicitly understood that in any of these contexts MARA
should supervise and seek to influence the conduct of both State and nonState parties.

60. Id. at 103.
61. See Peace Women, Sexual Violence Monitoring, http://www.peacewomen.org/
security-council/sexual-violence-indicators-and-monitoring [https://perma.cc/P66K-F3KF] (last

visited Oct. 31, 2021) (A mandated "naming and shaming" listing mechanism requires the

of
Secretary-General's Annual Report on Sexual Violence to name parties credibly suspected
armed
in
Parties
violence.
committing or being responsible for rape and other forms of sexual
conflict are also called upon to make specific, time-bound commitments to prohibit and punish
sexual violence, and the Secretary-General is asked to monitor those commitments.).
62. Bensouda, supra note 25.

63. Id.
64. S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010).
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Information is gathered in a strictly confidential manner, as well as in
conformity with the World Health Organization's 2007 Ethical and
Safety Recommendations for Researching, Documenting and Monitoring
Sexual Violence in Emergencies. Clearly this is to avoid, or at least
reduce, the risk for the safety of civilians and reporting entities. It is
envisaged that MARA will rely on information gathered from a large
number of sources in a given country context, including local government
authorities, health and psychosocial service providers, UN Civilian,
Police and Military Peacekeeping presence, UNCT actors, local and
international NGOs, civil society entities, religious institutions and faithbased networks. 6 5
Information is then reported to the SRSG-SVC on behalf of the
Secretary-General, responsible for promoting the implementation of
Security Council resolutions about CRSV. The SRSG-SVC, which works
with the technical support and assistance of UN entities under the
umbrella of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action),
has the duty through the established country-level arrangements to report
to the UN Secretary General and the Working Group on Conflict Related
Sexual Violence. 66 This is, indeed, a task of practical relevance since it
allows the UN Secretary General to have all the information he might
need for the elaboration of its Annual Report on Sexual Violence in
Armed Conflict and of its annexes, namely the main sources of
knowledge of the UN Security Council about sexual violence in armed
and post-conflict situations. 67 Documented evidence of a distinguishable
pattern of sexual crimes and abuses being committed with intention by
known or named armed groups or forces justifies the formal investigation
or mandating of MARA and the establishment of country-level
arrangements, as well as the inclusion of parties to conflict in the annexes
to the UN Secretary General's annual report.
It is submitted that information gathered by humanitarian agencies on
the ground through the MARA process constitutes direct advocacy
material with governments at the national and international level and with
parties to conflict. At a national level, these parties to conflict and
65. id
66. Bensouda, supra note 25, indicating that:
The arrangements should take into account the specificity of each country and
ensure a coherent and coordinated approach at the field-level, and must be
coordinated with and implemented in respect of the integrity and specificity of
the monitoring and reporting mechanism under resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882

(2009) on children and armed conflict.
67. According to Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations: "The Secretary-General
may bring to the attention of the Security-Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten
the maintenance of international peace and security."
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governments are demanded, on the basis of this information, to develop
time-bound and agreed action plans with UN Country Team (UNCT)
actors, and the United Nations to terminate and to prevent additional
sexual violence. Usual activities within these action plans include the
training of military personnel in preventing sexual crimes and concrete
commitments to hold offenders accountable through internal justice
systems. 68 At the international level, governments are demanded to
respond to the UN Secretary-General's annual report. Additionally, in
some circumstances, specific targeted actions such as sanctions set and
agreed by the Security Council, as previously instructed by the Security
Council Working Group on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, may be
approved against specific parties to conflict, especially those that are
deemed to be persistent offenders. The Security Council may also give
mandate to the Secretary General to include in the Annual Report through
an annex, a list of parties to a conflict that are credibly suspected of
committing or being responsible for acts of rape and other forms of sexual
violence. This operative provision has been described as a "naming and
shaming" process unique to resolution 1960.69
B. The Subject Matter of Monitoringand Reporting
There are limitations on the subject matter of the MARA, namely, on
the types of crimes and abuses against civilians that may be considered
under the scope of this monitoring and reporting procedure. Resolution
1960 and the Provisional Guidance Note only empower the MARA to
review conflict-related sexual crimes, which clearly do not represent an
exhaustive list of crimes against civilians during armed conflict. The
MARA is not authorized to monitor and respond to crimes other than
sexual offenses, crimes in armed conflicts, and post-armed conflict
situations.
Things are different when the conduct of the parties to conflict is
concerned. Under the Provisional Guidance Note, the conduct of all
parties to conflict may be investigated and monitored by the MARA
process. And this includes both state and non-state parties.
In regards to non-state parties, the MARA is focused especially on
sexual crimes committed by organized armed entities or groups. This
focus demands drawing a distinction, case by case, between armed groups
and civilian criminal gangs that MARA shall make according to
70
international humanitarian law rules and standards. When armed
68. The Security Council has repeatedly emphasized in resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1960
the need for better information on trends, patterns and early warning indicators of sexual violence.
69. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 103.
70. The test for distinguishing armed groups from civilian criminal gangs is articulated in
international humanitarian law and revolves around the notion of a minimum level of organization
reflected in some form of responsible command. See U. N. Office for the Coordination of
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elements are directly involved in criminal activities and also have
political motivations they may be reported under the MARA processand this is with the condition that there is a preliminary verification of the
information that such armed entities are effectively committing conflictrelated sexual violence according to the "Analytical and Conceptual
Framing of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence."
C. The Governing Law of the Monitoringand ReportingProcess

'

Another issue worthy of consideration is the law applicable to the
MARA process. According to the Provisional Guidance Note, the MARA
monitors the conduct of the parties to conflict for the protection of women
and girls (but also of men and boys) against sexual violence and abuse
through the prism of the legal duties and obligations of the UN as regards
to monitoring and reporting on sexual violence. These duties and
obligations have been articulated in the landmark resolution of the UN
General Assembly on assistance and support to victims of sexual
exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff and related personnel 7
and implicitly recalled in the UN Action Against Sexual Violence in
Conflict (UN Action).
Further clarifying this point in relation specifically to the operation
and functioning of the Working Group on conflict-related sexual
violence, the Provisional Guidance Note emphasizes that human rights
monitoring principles developed by the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) like the principles of doing no harm, respect
for the mandate and knowledge of the standards, credibility, impartiality,
objectivity, confidentiality and security should be the primary
consideration in the enforcement of MARA. 72 What remains less clear is
whether general international law also constitutes a standard of review.
The absence of any explicit reference to customary international law
amongst the standards of review suggests a negative answer. Arguably,
the compliance of the conduct of the parties to conflict with norms of
international law should be considered beyond the MARA's current
scope of materially collecting information and data on sexual crimes and
abuses in armed conflict and post-conflict scenarios. Notwithstanding the
fact that the MARA is based on international legal rules and provisions
that are in place for the protection of civilian persons against sexual
Humanitarian Affairs, Analytical and Conceptual Framingof Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
(Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.humanitwianresponse.info/fr/operations/pakistan/document/analy
tical-and-conceptual-framing-conflict-related-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/C8WG-RCDP].

71. G.A. Res. 62/214,

¶¶ 6-14 (Mar. 7, 2008).

72. See U.N. Secretary General, Provisional Guidance Note: Implementation of Security

Council Resolution 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security (Conflict-related Sexual
Violence) (June 2011), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e23ed5d2.pdf.provisional [https://perma

.cc/XUB8-CFFH].
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violence and abuse might eventually lead to a different conclusion. As
the MARA is deemed to be classified as a "fact-finding" mechanism that
operates under the governance of the UN Security Council, it then follows
that it would be reasonable to eventually allow it to gather its information
and data on conflict-related sexual abuses and violences with no specific
regard to general international law.
D. How the Monitoring & Reporting Mechanism (MARA) Works
The MARA was established mainly to hold state and non-state armed
73
groups publicly accountable for their sexual and gender-based violence
in armed conflicts, post-conflict situations and other situations of
concern. Regarding its work and functioning, the MARA process
operates at three separate but closely interrelated levels: (1) country-level
coordination; (2) UN Headquarters-level coordination; and (3) the UN
Security Council level.
Information gathering is a prerogative of the bodies in charge of the
country-level coordination, namely of the UN Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) (where there are peacekeeping or political
missions) or alternatively of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian
Coordinator (RC/HC) (where there are no peacekeeping or political
missions). These bodies enjoy broad investigatory powers, as indirectly
confirmed by the Provisional Guidance Note which indicates that the
SRSG and the RC/HC may gather information from a large variety of
sources including local government authorities and institutions, UN
Civilian, Police and Military Peacekeeping presence, local and
international NGOs, civil society organisations, religious institutions and
faith-based networks. Upon receiving information on the occurrence of
74
conflict-related sexual crimes from the SRSG or RC/HC the Working
Group on CRSV technically reviews it. This is in order to provide
objective and reliable information on these crimes to the UN SecretaryGeneral for the drafting of its country reports on sexual violence. This
review also serves giving some objective and reliable information and
73. According to the CEDAW Recommendation No. 19, gender-based violence is

women
"violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects
suffering,
or
harm
sexual
or
mental
physical,
inflict
that
acts
includes
it
and
disproportionately"
the Elimination
threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. U.N. Comm. On
ofDiscrimination
Elimination
the
on
Committee
the
of
ofDiscrimination Against Women, Report
Against Women, 11th session, 16 U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (June 24, 1992), https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/148001 ?ln=en [https://perma.cc/54AR-7QXC]; see also Inter-Agency Standing Comm.,
Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence Interventions in HumanitarianSettings: Focusing on
Preventionofand Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies (Sept. 1, 2005), https://interagency
standingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy

files/guidelines_for-genderbased_violence_interve

6 2 3 45
ntionsinhumanitarian settingsenglish_.pdf [https://perma.cc/K 5 - N ].
74. SRSG or RC/HC should ensure that a technical-level Working Group on Conflict
Related Sexual Violence is established for implementation of resolution 1960.
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data to the UN Security Council for triggering its future actions towards
their perpetrators, including for the use of the information provided by
the MARA process as the basis for recommending investigations on these
crimes by the ICC. 75
E. An Analysis ofthe Criticismsof the MARA Mechanism
The MARA has been increasingly used as an institutional tool for the
engagement ofparties in conflict and advocacy with themselves and other
political actors in a position to exercise influence on the parties. 76 And
this is mainly in order to secure time-bound commitments to end CRSV
and to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts to build capacity to
address this form of violence. 77
Despite these and other successes facilitated by the participation and
engagement of the Women Protection Advisors (WPAs) in the daily work
and functioning of MARA, there are also various aspects of the MARA
process that are or may be criticised in public debates and writings. One
of the major and most common criticisms is that the MARA process
would be clearly designed to work in retrospect.78 This is notwithstanding
it might also function to indirectly prevent new SVC occurrences.
Another, and more general, criticism that has recently been voiced by
Catherine O'Rourke has to do with the fragmented protection of women's
rights in conflict of which MARA is partially indirectly responsible. 79 A
further possible criticism worthy of being recalled could be the lack of
consideration in MARA of the fact that women experience armed conflict
in a different way than men. This is a criticism that could be easily
motivated by reference to the subject-matter scope of application of
MARA that encompasses sexual crimes and abuses committed either
against women or men.
75. Working Groups should prepare Terms of Reference to guide their work, tailored to the
specific country context. The Terms of Reference should specify division of labour i.e. UN entity
leads in execution of particular functions such as monitoring and verification, etc.
76. By 2018, all peacekeeping operations with protection of civilians mandates had also
established monitoring arrangements and incorporated early warning indicators for CRSV into
their protection structures. See Louise Olsson et al., Peacekeeping Prevention: Strengthening
Efforts to PreemptConflict-relatedSexual Violence, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE (July 13, 2020),

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2020.1782752
2NS7].
77. Id.

[https://perma.cc/F3U6-

78. See Crawford Jamieson, Student Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of the Women

Peace and

Security Agenda,
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PA.

SCH.

OF
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(Dec.

9,

https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10043-wps-report [https://perma.cc/TM5F-XQ8V.
79. See

CATHERINE

O'

ROURKE,
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IN

ARMED
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2019),
UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-33 (2020). See also Gloria Gaggioli, Sexual violence in armedconflicts:
A violation of internationalhumanitarianlaw and human rights law, INT'L REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS (Sept. 2015), https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/sexual-violence-armed-conflicts
-violation-international-humanitarian-law-and-human-rights [https://perma cc/ULW6-F4ZL].
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F. The MARA 's StructuralInability to Monitor Violence in Armed
Conflict Situations Other than Sexual Violence
The MARA's inability to monitor and report on forms of violence
other than sexual violence and abuse is one of the most evident problems
80
connected with the work and functioning of the MARA process. First,
the MARA has very limited authority, if any, to monitor any human rights
violation against civilian personnel even if committed in an armed
conflict or post-conflict situation. In fact, MARA is not an independent
human rights monitoring body, and under its operating rules and
procedures it is essentially expected to gather information and data on
sexual violence and abuse in armed conflict as well as data on the
perpetrators. It also follows, then, that the MARA has a weak capacity to
prevent sexual violences and abuses from taking place in armed conflict
settings.
The MARA is unable to prevent gender-based violence, however, this
is a task that is often accomplished by the Women Protection Advisors
(WPAs) on missions. For example, this happened in the case of the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUC), 81 as documented by the Inter Press Service News
Agency and also by a Stop Rape Now lengthy report on the
implementation of the MARA in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). 82 In the latter, it was found, in particular, that: "the presence of a
WPA/Human Rights Officer facilitated coordination of the work of the
MARA Working Group; brought relevant actors together to analyse the
information; and, facilitated the analysis of trends and patterns to inform
83
UN responses to sexual violence on the ground." Although helpful, the
WPAs cannot be the only modality to be used for preventing sexual
violence and abuse in armed conflict and post-conflict scenarios. Indeed,
that this cannot be so is indirectly confirmed by the recent chronicle of
armed conflicts that witnesses a growing and unprecedented escalation of
sexual violences and abuses against women and girls in particular, and
this includes those conflicts that are or were characterized by the presence
UN's
80. See, e.g., KATY BARNETT & ANNA JEFFERYS, FULL OF PROMISE: HOW THE
(stressing
(2008)
14
CHILDREN
PROTECT
BETTER
CAN
MONITORING AND REPORTING MECHANISM
that in Nepal the single most common frustration for MRM Task Force members-including
international and national NGOs-was the lack of adequate programmatic follow-up for children
reporting violations).

81. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010, MONUC was

renamed as of 1 July the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect the new phase reached in the country. See MONUC
U.N. Org. Mission in the Dem. Rep. Congo, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/

mission/past/monuc/ [https://perma.cc/8AFR-FDPH] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021).
82. According to the United Nations (UN), over 200,000 women have suffered sexual
violence in the DRC since the armed conflict began. See Gaggioli, supra note 79, at 504.
83. Id.
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of WPAs. 84 Moreover, that this cannot be so is also accepted and
authoritatively acknowledged by the UN Secretary-General, Ant6nio
Guterres, in a well-known speech of 2019 dealing with the
implementation of the Women Peace and Security Agenda and its current
needs. 85
IV. THE MARA'S INABILITY TO ENHANCE THE PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE PERPETRATORS

-

A further criticism of the existing process of monitoring and reporting
on sexual violence and assaults in armed conflicts and post conflict
situations is that MARA is not able to improve the external accountability
of the perpetrators of these crimes. First, in relation to MARA's role of
enhancing public accountability, some critics have claimed that MARA
lacks the power to directly refer the perpetrators of sexual violence to
international justice mechanisms.8 6
The main fact corroborating this claim is that, ten years and more after
the implementation of MARA, there is still a lack of timely and
comprehensive data and information on CRSV in the UN Reports. 87 The
UN Secretary-General has attempted to explain this underreporting
situation by referring to the intimidation and stigmatization that is
generally suffered by the survivors of sexual violence and abuse 88 and
also by referring to the restrictions on access to the pertinent data items
for the competent UN authorities. 89
In addition, some critics have rightly argued that the lack of adequate
financial resources for MARA, 90 and the lack of its integration in the

84. See also Louise Bosetti & Hannah Cooper, Where are the Women? How the UN is
POL'Y RsCH. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://cpr.unu.edu/where-are-the-women-how-the-un-is-fal ling-short-on-gender-and-conflict
.html [https://perma.cc/82AT-97P2].
85. See U.N. News, 'Real change' involving women in peace and security, still too slow,
Guterres tells Security Council (Oct. 29, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1050151
[https://perma.cc/GJB5-3PBL].
86. See Jameieson, supra note 78, at 19.
87. See U.N., Handbookfor United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding
to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2020), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/2020.08-UN-CRSV-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JY2-AU5X].

Falling Short on Gender and Conflict, U.N. UNIV. CTR. FOR

88. U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 33d mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.33 (Nov. 24, 2010).
89. Rep. of the S.C., at 86, 91, 92, 108, U.N. Doc. S/2019/280 (2019), https://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_280_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN 9G-9NDU].
90. See Pramila Patten, Statement of SRSG-SVC Pramila Patten, Security Council Open

Debate on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, "Turning Commitments into Compliance,"OCHA
Services (July 17, 2020), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/statement-srsg-svc-pramila-pattensecurity-council-open-debate-conflict-related-sexual [https://perma.cc/HJA2-2PZJ] (statement of
SRSG-SVC Pramila Patten according to which: "the MARA is only as effective as the resources

and capacity behind it."). But see UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN
https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/about-us/un-action/
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structure and functioning of the UN peace missions, also compromises
the capacity of the MARA process to boost the external accountability of
sexual violence perpetrators. 91 Rather than an accountability-based
argument, this criticism focuses on MARA's operation and functioning.
Because the monitoring activities of MARA are usually carried out in
concreto by local NGOs that often are not sufficiently trained and/or by
UN interim personnel that change frequently, any data and information
gathered by them remains potentially incomplete and thus questionable.
Perhaps the best example that may and was put forward to support this
9
claim are the monitoring activities of MARA in South Sudan. This is
because these activities were carried out in the Protection of Civilians
(PoC) sites 9 3 but not also in outside areas of the country like the Southern
Unity, regardless of sexual violence and abuse in those areas being at that
94
time widespread and systematic. Another supporting example that can
be brought here is Libya, where CRSV perpetrated against both female
and male asylum seekers has remained largely unreported by MARA
officers-and this, again, regardless of the fact that numerous CRSV
incidents in Libya were denounced by various parties including leading
96
humanitarian organizations 9 5 and the ICC Prosecutor.
These and other examples are also useful for indicating another
common reason for criticism of MARA: namely its attitude of limiting
the monitoring activities to the escalating acts of CRSV, leaving aside
any intervention upon early warnings on situations that might lead to new
(last visited Nov. 2, 2021) (in January 2020 a successor fund was developed, the Conflict-Related
Sexual Violence MPTF, or "CRSV-MPTF." The CRSV-MPTF focuses on a survivor-centred
as
prevention and response, the root causes of CRSV, greater justice and accountability, as well
CRSVThe
joint impact including through strengthened coordination and information-sharing.
MPTF focuses on a survivor-centred prevention and response, the root causes of CRSV, greater
justice and accountability, as well as joint impact including through strengthened coordination

and information-sharing.).

91. See, e.g., S. Davies et al., What Works (and Fails) in Protection, in THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

92.

170

(2018).

Ninth Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the UN

Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict Fund (June 11, 2018), https://www.un.org/
sexualviolenceinconfl ict/wp-content/uploads/reportun-action-progress-report-2017/UN-Action-

Progress-Report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5JQ-BDZV].
93. See Damian Lilly, Protectionof Civilians sites: a new type of displacementsettlement?,
HUM. PRAC. NETWORK (Sept. 2014), https://odihpn.org/magazine/protection-of-civilians-sites-anew-type-of-displacement-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/K5PT-HY63].
94. Ninth Consolidated Annual Progress Report, supra note 92.
95. UNSMIL, UN in Libya Statement on "International Day for the Elimination of Sexual
Violence in Conflict Zones" (June 19, 2020), https://unsmil.unmissions.org/un-libya-statement"international-day-elimination-sexual-violence-conflict-zones."
96. Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Nineteenth Report of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council pursuantto UNSCR 1970

(May 5, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/19th-report-icc-otp-UNSC-libya-ENG
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V6P-ZWFV].
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atrocities. Davis and Swaine have commented on this attitude when they
argued that the reason behind it shall be found in the political propension
of the UN Security Council to restrict its action to armed conflict and post
conflict situations that are already in the UN Security Council's peace
and security agenda. 9 7
A. The Abolition of the DistinctionBetween Men and Women in the
Operationand Functioningof the MARA 's Processand Reporting of
Sexual Violence
Not only is MARA unable to enhance the public accountability of the
perpetrators of CRSV incidents, it is also unable to distinguish between
the harmful effects caused by CRSV respectively to men and on women.
This is surprising, considering that the diversity of.the effects produced
by CRSV on women and men has been theorized by scholars from legal
and social sciences since long before the establishment of the MARA. 98
Professor Sandesh Sivakumaran's lengthy article in the European
Journal ofInternationalLaw offers a vivid example in this respect when
he claims the existence of particular forms of male sexual violence such
as enforced nudity, enforced masturbation and genital violence. 99 And
also when he insisted on the necessity of providing different forms of
protection for men and women victims of violence and abuses in armed
conflicts. 100
Less surprising, though equally unfortunate, is that MARA embodies
the distinction between sexual violence committed in armed conflict
settings and sexual violence suffered but not related to armed or post
conflict scenarios. As a result of this distinction, only the first type of
violence is monitored by the MARA. Rightly, this distinction too has
been contested by scholars and opinionists as being meaningless, and this
is mainly because it determines the inability for the UN Security Council
to regularly receive information and data on sexual violence and abuse
that is only indirectly related to an armed conflict.10' The MARA's
monitoring activities in Nigeria perfectly illustrate this point. Here, in
97. Aisling Swaine, PracticingWomen Peace and Security in Post-ConflictReconstruction,

INT'L LAW AND
Saul eds., 2016).
in

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POL'Y 66,

91 (James Sweeny & Matthew

98. See generally Nicola Henry, Theorizing Wartime Rape: Deconstructing Gender,

Sexuality, and Violence, 30 GENDER & SOC'Y 44 (2016); Malaika Rajandran, Conference Papers:
1. New Forms of Conflict and Violence Sexual Violence and InternationalLaw, 23 REFUG. SURv.
Q. 58 (2004).
99.
100.
101.
of sexual

See Sivakumaran, supra note 55, at 253.
See Sivakumaran, supra note 55, at 275-76.
See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 18, at 2035 ("Some doubt that meaningful measurements
violence are even possible."); Carlo Koos, What Do We Know About Sexual Violence in

Armed Conflicts? (Ger. Inst. of Glob. & Area Studies, Working Paper No. 275, 2015),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191737/wp275_koos.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR8T-CE6R].
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fact, the monitoring and reporting activities were restricted to the
northern part of the country where the terroristic group, Boko Haram was
02
active in committing sexual crimes.' This is regardless of the fact that
grave sexual violence and abuse was also taking place in southern
Nigeria, including the capital city, where thousands of women were
forcibly hired by human traffickers for sexual exploitation. The reason
for this was precisely that in the south of Nigeria there was no armed
conflict going on and thus no possibility for the MARA to be established
and operate.
B. PossibleAlternatives to the MARA
Notwithstanding various recurring difficulties and problems with the
MARA, scholars and practitioners have indicated few alternatives. This
is far from surprising: MARA has not received much attention from
scholars and practitioners so far. Those few who have addressed the
subject have explored the option of fixing the MARA's shortcomings by
working within its current institutional framework. One approach has
focused on improving the MARA's capacity of gathering information on
CRSV by allowing its components to get better training on sexual crimes
and on their investigation techniques. Exemplary of this approach is the
International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual
Violence in Conflict. 10 3 Introduced in 2017, the Protocol aims to help
overcome the obstacles to prosecution of sexual crimes and abuses, by
setting out clearly and comprehensively the basic principles of
04
documenting sexual violence as a serious breach of international law.1
Related to this option is the proposal of a UN-Action for sharing
information and data and providing responses to sexual- and genderbased violence.1 05 Another and more sophisticated approach has focused
on widening the MARA's mandate by allowing the body to monitor and
report on sexual violence incidents other than those that are directly
associated with armed conflict or post conflict settings. Other proposals
have concentrated on the need for better problem-solving by ensuring that
the MARA has the capacity to supervise fundamental follow-up actions
102. Joe Read, 'Sexual violence and the Boko Haram crisis in north-east Nigeria', HUM.

ExcH., Oct. 2017, at 24.

103. See Sara Ferro Ribeiro & Dana6 van der Straten Ponthoz, Best Practice on the
Documentation of Sexual Violence as a Crime or Violation of InternationalLaw, Mar. 2017, at
11; see also Diane Lupig, Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes
before the InternationalCriminalCourt, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & THE LAW 43 1(2009).
104. See Lupig, supra note 103, at 457; see also Chile Eboe-Osuji, Grave Breaches as War
Crimes: Much Ado About Serious Violations?, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/827EE9EC-

50 95 -48C0-AB04-E38686EE9A80/283279/GRAVEBREACHESMUCHADOABOUTSERIO
2
USVIOLATIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U5S-93 J] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
105. See House of Lords Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Report, 2015-

2016, HL 123 (UK).
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and measures taken in regard to the victims of sexual violence for the
enhancement and implementation of their rights.1 06
C. Widening the MARA 's Mandate
One set of suggested modifications to the present MARA deals with
the enlargement of its institutional mandate to cover any type of sexual
violence and abuse; which would essentially transform the MARA
process into a holistic compliance mechanism of the international legal
framework of sexual violence.1 07 Dr No8lle Qu6nivet implicitly
advocates this evolution when she claims that the reporting system under
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discriminations
Against Women (CEDAW) might be used in accordance with the
CEDAW Committee's General Recommendation No. 30 on women in
conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict, and also when she
encourages the CEDAW Committee to include the consideration of the
human rights of women in conflict situations in its monitoring process, in
accordance with CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30.108 Dr.
Qu6nivet as well as the House of Lords, in its thematic report on sexual
violence in armed conflict, calls for an enlargement of the MARA's
mandate that, seen from their perspective, would need to be accompanied
by renewed attention to and better focus on the prevention of sexual
violence in conflict.' 09 Having said that, it is worth recalling that the 11th
report of the United Nations Secretary General on CRSV contains critical
remarks on the MARA's mandate, in particular when it indirectly
deplored the lack of good evidence that the MARA process has produced
regarding rape and other forms of sexual violence and abuse and also
when it recalls that sexual violence and abuse is rampant in most armed
conflict and post conflict scenarios."0

106. See G.A. Res. 60/47, ¶ 11, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005) (describing victims' rights in
general and on the victim's right to remedies in particular).
107. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT, REPORT OF SESSION, 2015-

16, HL 180, at 78 (UK).
108. See also SELECT COMMITTEE ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT, REPORT OF
2015-16, HL 180, at 7 (UK).
109. See Nodlle Qu~nivet, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (Feb.

SESSION,

2017),

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313528275_SexualViolence_inArmedConflict
[https://perma.cc/3QZF-K4BK]; see also NOELLE N. R. QU$NIVET, SEXUAL OFFENSES IN ARMED
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 10

(2005).

110. See Save the Children, The UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children's
Rights in Armed Conflict, SOMALI FAM. SERV. (July 2009), http://ussfs.org/sfs/wp-content/

uploads/2012/07/STC-Policy-Brief-on-MRM-July-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZZ9-G7CK].
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D. Encouraginga MARA Follow-Up Approach to Sexual Violence in
Armed Conflict
Similarly to Dr. No8lle Qudnivet, the drafters of the Provisional
Guidance Note on the Intersections Between the Monitoring, Analysis
and Reporting Arrangements (MARA) & the Gender-Based Violence
Information Management System (GBVIMS) of 2016 (the Provisional
Guidance Note on the Intersections between MARA and GBVIMS), also
discuss the need for the MARA to develop a broader "follow-up"
approach to the implementation of its activities."' In essence, the drafters
of the Provisional Guidance Note on the Intersections between MARA
and GBVIMS see benefits in expanding the role of the MARA from a
mainly crime monitoring role to that (wider role) of an active and
112
effective supervisor of follow-up issues and programmes as well.
To highlight some of these benefits, these drafters use the experience
of the MARA country task forces in C6te d'Ivoire, Mali and South Sudan
as case studies." 3 A common finding in such cases is that, although there
are some positive examples of use of the information and data gathered
through the MARA process to push for improvements at the national
level, the potential of the MARA might be used to greater effect in each
context to press for the elaboration of national solutions to support the
11 4
Following a similar approach and
victims/survivors of sexual violence.
Hoayda Darkal and Lisa Jane
Thomas,
Natasha
line of reasoning, Sian
findings might have been
and
Goodson lament that the MARA reports
used more strategically to go beyond the mere monitoring and reporting
of the CRSV incidents to the UN Security Council and UN GeneralSecretary. 1 5
111. See also Qudnivet, Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & InternationalLaw, supra note
109.
112. UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence
in Conflict, supra note 28, at 4-5.
113. Five countries were selected for an "accelerated rollout" of the MARA: Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cbte d'Ivoire, Mali, and South Sudan. MARA working
groups are operational in three out of these five countries.
114. See Christine Evans, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS
CONFICT 128 (2012) (discussing the right to reparation of the victims of sexual
ARMED
OF
law: An
violences and abuses at armed conflites); see also Sofia Levy Nilsson, Extending the

analysis of the ICC and sexual violence in armed conflict (2018)3 (M.A. thesis, Uppsala
University) (http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?piddiva2% AI218567&dswid=6311

in armed
[https://permacc/MP3R-SVJ7]) (writing on the notions of "victims of sexual violence
conflict" within the framework of international criminal law).
and
115. See Sian Natasha Thomas et al., Monitoring and reporting incidents of sexual
Rsch.
for
Inst.
Birmingham
of
(Univ.
16-17
journey,
refugee
the
gender-basedviolence across
into Superdiversity, Working Paper No. 29, 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/

331647108_Monitoringand reportingincidents_of_sexual_and gender-based_violence_across
therefugeejoumey [https://perma.cc/9J8V-FZY4].
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E. The Transformationof MARA Into A De Facto Though Not De Jure
Auxiliary Organ of the ICC as an Alternative
Predictably, the MARA process-while advanced and sophisticated
when it was established in 2010-has become the object of rethinking
during the subsequent years of its operation and functioning. It is because
the present MARA has largely failed to stop the advancement of CRSV
incidents,' 16 notwithstanding the fact that it has gathered evidence in
several armed conflict and post-conflict scenarios.I propose its
transformation into a new mechanism aimed at materially supporting the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC in the investigations of rapes
and other forms of sexual violences and abuses occurring in armed
conflict settings.
My proposal is in tune with the function of the ICC as a "security
court" employed by the UN Security Council with the mandate to help
restore international security and peace with regard to ongoing armed
conflicts.1 1 7 This is based upon six fundamental assumptions. First, in
today's era where rape and other forms of sexual violence are tragically
prevalent in several modern conflicts it is axiomatic that the duty to
prosecute and criminalize these acts constitutes one of the foundations
and objectives of contemporary international criminal law and justice."18
This is so regardless of the fact that the concept of "rape" as an
international crime is relatively new and recent. 119 In fact, rape was
116. An "incident" is broadly speaking any event, situation, or set of circumstances that has
the potential to require an investigation because it raises concern about a possible violation of
international humanitarian law. See NOAM LUBELL, JELENA PEJIC & CLAIRE SIMMONS, GENEVA
ACADEMY, GUIDELINES ON INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
LAW, POLICY, AND GOOD PRACTICE 10 (2019).

117. See Florian Jessberger & Julia Geneuss, The Many Faces of the InternationalCriminal
Court, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1081, 1081 (2012) (suggesting that the ICC is more thanjust a
criminal court proper adjudicating individual criminal responsibility). See also Melanie O'Brien,
Where Security Meets Justice: ProsecutingMaritime Piracyin the InternationalCriminal Court,
4 ASIAN J. INT'L L. 81 (2014); 3 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIM]NAL LAW 263

&

(2016) (also recalling that the ICC as a security court is "not subject to the usual constraints of
complementarity").
118. See, e.g., Anne-Marie de Brouwer, The Importance of UnderstandingSexual Violence
in Conflictfor Investigation andProsecutionPurposes(2015) 48 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 640 (2015);
PROSECUTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE AT THE ICTY 5 (Serge Brammertz

Michelle Jarvis eds., 2018). See also Helen Durham, Women, Armed Conflict and International
Law (2002), 84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 655, 655-59 (2002); Patricia Viseur Sellers, The
Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as Means of
Interpretation (unpublished manuscript, 2018) (on file with Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights) (recalling that: "Parallel to the post World War II developments
of 11IL, rape also incrementally gained recognition as an international crime, including as a crime
against humanity").
119. See Mark Ellis, Breakingthe Silence: Rape as an InternationalCrime, 38 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 225, 227 (2007); Maria Eriksson, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (2011); see also David Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in
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accepted as an express form of crime against humanity via the
incorporation of international crimes into domestic military codes and
national legislations,1 20 together with the other fact that there is a well
consolidated consensus on the definition of rape, both in terms of the
actus reus and mens rea, provide a confirmation for the above
conclusion.121 And the same does the listing of rape as an international
crime in the statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals of the
22
1990s and early years of the twenty-first century1 as well as the wide
range of offenses under which SGBC may be investigated and
prosecuted.1 23 The list of sexual assault crimes within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the international and mixed international forum has
gradually expanded after the drafting of the ICC Statute and of the ICC's
Rules of Evidence and Procedure offers further corroborating evidence in
this sense if needed.1 24 With things being as such, it is clear that it would
be both desirable and useful for the MARA to transform into a de facto
auxiliary organ of the ICC or, to say it more precisely, into a fact-finding
mechanism aimed at assisting the OTP of the ICC (its Gender26 and
and
Children's Unit in particular)12 in its preliminary examinations
investigations of rape and other forms of sexual violence and abuse
27
This is also especially evident if one
occurring in armed conflict.1
InternationalHumanitarianLaw as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J.

COMP. INT'L L. 219, 224 (2006).

120. See 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2193 (Jean-Marie Henkaerts

& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
121. See Henkaerts et al., supranote 120, at 2193

122. Id. at 2193.
123. Id.
124. See also Rosemary Grey & Louise Chappell, Prosecuting Sexual and Gender-Based
Crimes in the International Criminal Court: Inching Towards Gender Justice in Solange
Mouthaan & Olga Jurasz (eds.), Gender and War International and Transitional Justice
Perspectives(2019), at 209 (recalling that: "[t]he Statute gives the ICC power to prosecute a broad
see also
range of sexual and gender-based crimes in situations of war, conflict and genocide");

Maria del Rosario Oj inaga Ruiz, La prohibicidny criminalizaci6n en Derecho Internacionalde
las violencias sexuales contramujeres civiles en conflictos armados, 19 BOLETIN DE LA FACULTAD
DE DERECHO DE LA UNED, 199 (2002).

125. The Gender and Children's Unit was established to give help, advice and assistance to
the OTP divisions, including for sexual and gender-based crimes, during all phases (from the pre-

Genderanalysis phase onwards). See Diane Lupig, Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and
(2009).
4
1,
L.
POL'Y
SOC.
Based before the InternationalCriminal Court, 17 AM. J. OF GEND.
126. According to the Rome Statute, the OTP can launch preliminary examinations in

countries where there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes under the Statute have been
committed. See Carsten Stahn, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don 't, 15 J. OF INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 413 (2017). See also Erla Ylfa Oskarsdottir, The GenderedPoliticsBehind the International
Criminal Court, 14 E-INT'L RELATIONS (2020), https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/30/the-gendered4
politics-behind-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/VNW9-LVZ ].
127. According to the Rome Statute, appropriate measures should be taken to ensure the
effective investigation and prosecution of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court "in

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol33/iss1/2

28

Seatzu: The Standardized Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements

2021]

THE STANDARDIZED MONITORING, ANALYSIS AND REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS (MA RA)

69

considers the failures and difficulties of the OTP12 8 in investigating and
prosecuting CRSV and gender-based crimes, 12 9 notwithstanding some
important exceptions such as the notable charges in the Darfur case of
rape as a form of genocide.1 3 0 These failures and difficulties are well
illustrated and exemplified by the well-known Lubanga case concerning
the first person arrested by the ICC, where the Court (the OTP) did not
recognize and integrate the gender-based nature of crimes committed
against girl child soldiers into making their case during the trial. 13 1
Surprisingly, this was despite several allegations of girls being kidnapped
into the Lubangs's militia and being raped and/or kept as sex slaves.' 2
The second fundamental assertion relates to the implementation of
Article 54(1)(b) of the Rome Statute directing the ICC Prosecution to
investigate and prosecute crimes in a gender-sensitive way, as well as to
the implementation and enforcement of the ICC Policy Paper on Sexual

particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence or violence against children." (Art.

54(1)(b)). See Lupig, supra note 125, at 433.
128. See, e.g., Recent Policy Paper, InternationalCriminalLaw-Sexual and Gender-Based
Crimes-ICC Outlines Policies to Help Improve ProsecutorialOutcomes-The Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 128 HARv. L. REV.
793, 797-800 (2014); Fatou Bensouda, Looking Back, Looking Ahead - Reflections from the
Office of the Prosecutorof the ICC, 11 WAsH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 437, 443 (2012); Olga
Jurasz, Gender-Based Crimesat the ICC: Where is the Future?, 108 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 429, 432

(2015).
129. Kelly Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes

Tribunals xiv (1997); Maria Eriksson Baaz, & Maria Stern, Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity,
Violence, andSexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC), 53 INT'L STUDIES Q. 495, 503
(2009); Susana Sacouto & Katherine Cleary, The Importance of Effective Investigation of Sexual
Violence and Gender-BasedCrimes at the InternationalCriminalCourtSymposium: Prosecuting
Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes Before International/ized Criminal Courts, 2 17 AM. J. OF
GEND. Soc. POL'Y LAw 337 (2009); see also Erla Ylfa Oskarsdottir, The Gendered PoliticsBehind
the InternationalCriminal Court, E-INT'L RELATIONS (2020), https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/30/
the-gendered-politics-behind-the-international-criminal-court/
[https://perma.cc/YBZ3-PT5D]
(focusing on the difficulties of the OTP in adopting a gender analysis approach to its investigation
and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes). See generally, Binaifer Nowrojee, We Can
Do Better Investigatingand ProsecutingInternationalCrimes of Sexual Violence, DOCPLAYER,
http://docplayer.net/5822787-We-can-do-better-investigating-and-prosecuting-internationalcrimes-of-sexual-violence-by-binaifer-nowrojee-1-nowrojee-fas-harvard.html
[https://perma.cc/
X7DJ-AEMG] (discussing the difficulties of investigating sexual crimes ex multis).

130. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No.

ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4,

2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.PDF [https://perma.cc/97GL-SM23];
Lupig, supra note 103, at 322.
131. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the case of the Prosecutor v.

Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.refworld.org/
cases,ICC,4f69a2db2.html [https://perma.cc/7B9L-GFNE].
132. Jurasz, supra note 128, at 430; Susana Sacouto & Katherine Cleary, supra n. 129, at
341; see generallyAlex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the InternationalCriminal
Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. OF INT'L L. AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 227 (2009).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

29

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

70

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33

and Gender-Based Crimes that was adopted by the OTP in 2014.133
Although the implementation of the ICC Policy Paper has yielded
important results,1 3 4 it would be hard to deny that it would improve
further if the OTP, that currently suffers from "overall basic size and
capacity constraints," 135 was systematically assisted and helped by the
MARA process in its preliminary examinations and investigations of
sexual crimes.1 36
Third, the above-indicated reform of the MARA seems to be
suggested and largely justified by the language of the UN Security
Council resolutions concerning sexual violence against girls and women
in situations of armed and post-armed conflict, including in resolutions
1960 of 2010 and 2106 of 2013. Given that the language that was used in
these Security Council resolutions is a language that explicitly recalls and
explicitly refers to the range of sexual violence offenses as addressed in
the Rome Statute.1 37
Fourth, the above-mentioned reform of MARA, if adopted, would
help the OTP through the fact- finding evidence provided to it by MARA
in looking more closely and thoroughly at the victims of sexualised
violence and at the conflict wherein that violence was committed.
Moreover (and striclty connected with this) the above-mentioned reform
would also support the OTP in collecting the evidence necessary.to meet
the "reasonable basis" criteria to proceed with an investigation as
38
requested by Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute.1

133. See Valerie Oosterveld, The ICCPolicy Paper on Sexual and Gender-BasedCrimes: A
Crucial Step for International Criminal Law, (2018) 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 443,
3 2
24
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol /iss / [https://permacc/L8WS-6JRYJ; Dieneke
at the InternationalCriminal Court, in
violence
de Vos, Prosecutingsexual and gender-based

Laura J. Shepherd (ed.), Handbookon Gender and Violence (2019), at 353; Erla Ylfa Oskarsdottir,
supra note 125.
134. Jurasz, supra note 128, at 430.
1-35. See Kai Ambos, Office of the Prosecutor: Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation(Int'l Crim. Ct.) 57 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, 1131 (2018).
136. Ambos, supra note 135, at 1131.
137. See Francoise Krill, The Protectionof Women in InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 249
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 337, 359 (1985); Hilmi Zawati, Review Essay of Rethinking Rape Law:
Internationaland Comparative PerspectivesEdited by Clare Mcglynn and Vanessa Munro (New
York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2010), 10 J. OF INT'L LAW & INT'L RELATIONS 31-43; See Alain-Guy

Tachou-Sipowo, The Security Council on Women in War: Between Peacebuilding and
HumanitarianProtection, 92 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, 199 (2010).
138. "Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute sets the threshold for determining whether the
available evidence is sufficient, requiring a 'reasonable basis' to advance to investigation." See
Alexa Koenig et al., Open Source Fact-Finding in Preliminary Examinations, in QUALITY
2
CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMiNATION: , 681-82 (Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., 2018),
2
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 018/09/Preliminary-Examinations.-Chapter-

34-Koenig-McMahon-Mehandru-and-Bhattacharjee.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X2C-GS8P] (stressing
that: "In making this determination" whether the available evidence is sufficient to advance an
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Fifth, the above-mentioned reform would also help the OTP in
minimizing, if not eliminating, the necessity for this body to make
recourse to human rights reports produced by NGOs. A recourse that,
though allowed by OTP Policy Paperon PreliminaryExaminations,139 is
difficult and highly problematic, 4 0 as it can lead amongst other things to
the risks of overly simplistic narratives of the sexual violences and abuses
as explained in particular by Dov Jacobs and Catherine Harwood.' 4 1
Lastly, the suggested reform of MARA would enlarge and enrich the
UN Security Council's interaction with the ICC, which is currently
restricted solely to the Council's recourse to the referral procedure to the
ICC. Indeed this is another effect of the suggested reform whose utility
cannot be underestimated, in particular when the many problems and
criticisms connected to the above-mentioned referral procedure are taken
into consideration. 4 2
investigation, "the OTP must grapple with all of the information at its disposal, including both
traditional and-newer forms of evidence").
139. ICC OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, at 31, (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/acb906/ [https://perma.cc/HSB5-2CMN].
140. See Morten Bergsmo & William H. Wiley, "Human Rights Professionals and the
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of Core International Crimes," 1 3, in MANUAL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS
(Siri

Ingvild Burkey & Hege

Mork,

eds.

2008),

Skdre,

https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8362d5/

[https://perma.cc/38J6-2VTQ].
141. See Dov Jacobs & Catherine Harwood, International Criminal Law Outside The
Courtroom: The Impact of Focusing on International Crimesfor the Quality of Fact-Findingby

International Commissions of Inquiry, in

QUALITY CONTROL

[N

FACT-FINDING,

325, 325-57

(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2013), https://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo [https://perma.cc/JB4TN69Y] (stressing that "[t]echnically, ... human rights reports are to be considered as one of the
weakest possible sources of criminal evidence, namely anonymous hearsay[.]"); see also Carsten
Stahn & Dov Jacobs, The Interaction Between Human Rights Fact-Findingand International
Criminal Proceedings:Towards a (New) Typology, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FACT-FINDING 255 (2016); Stephen Wilkinson, Finding the facts: Standards of proof and
information handling in monitoring, reporting, and fact-finding missions, HARV. PROGRAM ON
HUM. POL'y & CONFLICT RSCH., 14, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2400927
[https://perma.cc/R52N-8DF6] (Feb. 2014); Micaela Frulli, Fact-Findingor Paving the Road to

CriminalJustice?: Some Reflections on United Nations Commissions of Inquiry, 10 1. OF INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1323, 1323-38 (2012); Human Rights First, The Role of Human Rights NGOs in
Relations to ICC Investigations: Discussion Paper, The Hague, Sept. 2004; Eva Buzo, Capturing
a Crisis: What Lessons Can We Learn from the 'Overdocumentation' of the Rohingya Crisis?,
JUST. IN CONFLICT

(May 20, 2020), https://justiceinconflict.org/2020/05/20/capturing-a-crisis-

what-lessons-can-we-learn-from-the-overdocumentation-of-the-rohingya-crisis/

[https://perma.

cc/TX63-DKW6].
142. For some criticial views on the referral mechanism to the ICC, see, e.g., Dapo Akande,
The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir's
Immunities, 7 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 333, 333-52 (2009); Gabriel M. Lentner, Why the ICC won't
get it right - The Legal Nature of UN Security Council Referrals and Al-Bashir Immunities,
https://www.ejiltalk.org/why-the-icc-wont-get-it-right-the-legal-nature-of-un-security-councilreferrals-and-al-bashir-immunities/ [https://perma.cc/LZ4D-GNJQ]; John-Marklyi, Re-thinking
the Authority of the UN Security Council to Refer Nationals of Non-party States to the ICC, 66
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The current proposal would contribute to better accountability on the
part of the perpetrators of sexual crimes and abuses in armed conflict.
This is for the simple reason that it would lead to a more effective,
efficient and systematic use of the gathered data and information on
CRSV by the OTP of the ICC, namely by the body that more than any
other is competent to investigate and prosecute CRSV incidents.
Given today's awareness of the major difficulties and failures
encountered so far by the OTP in delivering real and not "distant
justice"1 43 and that the "success or failure of a criminal case is always
built upon the quality of investigation,"'44 restrictions to direct (not
filtered) communications between the MARA and OTP are both
inappropriate and contrary to the international community's intent to act
jointly in fighting rapes and other forms of sexual violence and abuses in
armed conflict settings.
Accordingly, there is no reason why the MARA should not become
and operate as a mechanism working defacto in close cooperation with
the OTP of the ICC. In other words, there is no compelling reason why,
though not replacing the OTP's Gender and Children's Unit, the MARA
process could not become and operate as an additional form of gathering
information and data on CRSV incidents.
While the present proposal seeks to bring about effective
accountability on the part of state and non-armed state actors for their
sexual crimes in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, it is also
consistent with the legal doctrine of functional necessity.' This is given
that the present proposal does not enlarge the current mandate of the
MARA process. In fact, though under this proposal the UN Security
Council would no longer have the last word on the use of the data and
information concerning CRSV incidents collected by MARA task forces,
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 391, 391 (stressing the fact that the ICC cannot be deemed to be
obliged to exercise the jurisdictional powers over nationals of non-party states conferred to it by
the Security Council). See also, Marie-Claude Roberge, The ICRC and the InternationalCriminal
Court (2019), https://odihpn.org/magazine/the-icrc-and-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://
to initiate
perma.cc/GH2D-BAMD] (stressing the "[p]rosecutor should be empowered
investigations and institute proceedings ex officio, on her or his own initiative").
143. For these difficulties, see Philip Clark, DistantJustice - The Impact Of The International

CriminalCourt On African Politics 1 (2018).
144. Douglas Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases: Lessons for the Prosecutor of the
InternationalCriminalCourt (PartIII), EJIL:TALK! (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/atale-of-two-cases-lessons-for-the-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court-part-iii/ [https://

perma.cc/NN88-YEJH].

145. See Michael Singer, JurisdictionalImmunity of International Organizations:Human
Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 65-67 (1996); Pieter H. F.
THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:
NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMMUNITIES (1994).
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the UN Security Council could always decide to rely, and most likely it
will do so in various circumstances, in the implementation of its Women
Peace and Security Agenda and in its future referrals to the ICC.
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